In all analysis we assume a consumer will buy the new product if she is indifferent between buying it and buying the old product. We use I to denote the incumbent, E the entrant, N the new product, O the old product, H the high type consumers, and L the low type consumers. We use backward induction to derive all equilibrium outcomes.
Suppose we arrive at stage 3. E will sell N to L because L will not buy O if she owns N. Hence, I selling O to L cannot be the equilibrium outcome in stage 3. Similarly, owing to the competition from I and v H > v L , any price of N that attracts L will also attract H, meaning E cannot sell N only to L before stage 3. This implies E selling N only to H cannot be the equilibrium outcome either.
Accordingly, if we arrive at stage 3, E will sell N to L. The price of N,
E's profit, π
With assumption 2, i.e., δq N > q O , dπ E z dz < 0 and
dz 2 < 0. Hence, the optimal period to sell N to L, z, is the lower bound, z * = y + 1.
To derive the outcomes in stage 2, we need to list the options of the vendors in stage 1. In stage 1, I's and E's decisions follow the normal form game below. Note that both I and E not selling any products contradicts the supposition that we are in stage 1 (defined only if a product is sold). Hence, we do not consider this combination.
Optimal decisions in stage 2 (period y)
1. H:N, L:O. Only E can sell N to L. Its profit, dy 2 < 0. Hence, the optimal period to sell N to L is the lower bound, y * = x + 1. No more products will be sold in the future. Stage 3 does not exist.
H:O, L:
?. There are two possibilities:
(a) L owns O. I will not be able to sell any product. E may sell N to L, to H, or to both H and L. It is straightforward to see that selling N only to L is not optimal. If E wants to sell N only to H, it has to ensure H prefers to buy it in stage 2 instead of not buying or buying it in stage 3. This implies
By (A4) and the analysis of stage 3, viz., (A1),
E's profit would then be
If E wants to sell N to both H and L, it must charge a lower price to attract L, giving profit
, meaning E will sell N only to H in stage 2. The optimal period is the lower bound, y
(b) L owns N. Once again, I will not be able to sell any product. E will sell N only to H with profit
The optimal period is the lower bound, y * = x + 1. (b) L owns N. All consumers have the best product. Stages 2 and 3 do not exist.
H:O, L:O.
The outcome is identical to that in case 2(a). E will sell N only to H.
5. H:N, L: -. I and E would compete to sell to L. Although L does not own any product, because of zero marginal cost and the presence of I who will always compete to sell O if E over-charges for N, the situation faced by E is similar to that in case 1, as if L owns O. Hence, the outcome is identical to that in case 1. I will not be able to sell any product.
6. H:O, L: N. The outcome is identical to that in case 2(b).
7. H:N, L: N. Both E and I cannot sell any product. Stages 2 and 3 do not exist.
Optimal decisions in stage 1 (period x)
The above analysis shows that I always earns zero profit in stage 2. The strategy combination, {I: not sell, E: N → H}, cannot constitute an equilibrium in stage 1 because when E is not selling to L, I can sell O to L at a sufficiently low price and earn a positive profit. Similarly, selling N only to L cannot be the equilibrium strategy in stage 1. With zero marginal cost, the highest price that E can charge for N is p
, which is what H is willing to pay for N. Hence, E will not be able to sell N to L alone, meaning any strategy pairs with E: N → L cannot constitute an equilibrium in stage 1. Now, consider the strategy pair {I : O → L, E : N → H}, which leads to case 1 in stage 2. L will buy N in stage 2. To sell O in stage 1, I must set the price such that L prefers to buy O in stage 1 instead of not buying, waiting until stage 2 to buy N, or buying N in stage 1. This implies
Similarly, to sell N to H in stage 1, E must set the price such that H prefers to buy N in stage 1 instead of not buying or waiting until stage 2 to buy N. This implies
Substituting from (A11), (A9) implies
where
The corresponding profits of I and E are
and
The optimal period is the lower bound, x * = 1.
Next, suppose E wants to sell N to both H and L. Because of the competition from I, E must charge a sufficiently low price for N to attract L. Hence, its profit is bounded by
is what E can earn by selling N only to H in stage 1 and then to L in stage 2. Hence, E selling N to both H and L in stage 1 cannot be an equilibrium strategy.
Finally, consider the strategy pair {I: O → L, E: not sell}, which leads to case 4 and in turn case 2(a) in stage 2. By (A6), E's discounted profit in stage 1,
Comparing with (A15), it is obvious that E prefers to sell N to H in stage 1. Hence, {I: O → L, E: not sell} cannot constitute an equilibrium either.
In summary, there exists a unique equilibrium in the competition between I and E. In this equilibrium, I will sell L to O and E will sell N to H in period 1, and then E will sell N to L in period 2. The prices are given in (A3), (A11), and (A12) with x = 1 and y = 2. The following results summarize the equilibrium outcomes.
Now, suppose N is introduced in period t 0 > 1. As we explain in Section 3, I will sell O to H in period 0 and to L in period 1. So, when N arrives, E will face a fully-saturated market whereby all consumers own O. The analysis is similar to the analysis of case 2(a) in stage 2. E will sell N to H in period t 0 and to L in period t 0 + 1. By (A1) and (A5),
E's profit in period t 0 ,
With δq N > q O , E prefers to sell N as soon as it arrives, i.e., in period t 0 .
B. Equilibrium outcomes with acquisition and no upgrade policy
The analysis of stage 3 is identical to that in the case with competition, so (A1) and (A2) apply. In stage 1, the vendor has five choices as shown in the following table. 
If it wants to sell O to L in stage 2, it has to ensure L prefers to buy O in stage 2 instead of not buying or buying N in stage 3. This implies
The vendor's profit,
. Hence, the vendor will sell N to L in period y. The optimal period is the lower bound, y * = x + 1. 
Substituting from (A1) and (A5), (B5) implies
The corresponding profit,
2. Sell N to L. This strategy leads to case 2 in stage 2. The vendor must set the price such that L prefers to buy N in stage 1 instead of not buying or buying it in stage 2, and H prefers to buy N in stage 2. These imply
, and
3. Sell N to H. This strategy leads to case 3 in stage 2. The vendor must set the price such that H prefers to buy N in stage 1 instead of not buying or buying it in stage 2, and L prefers to buy N in stage 2. These imply
which satisfies (B14) if and only if v H L > Υ 1 . Accordingly, the vendor's profit,
The optimal period is the lower bound, x * = 1. 
Substituting from (A3), (B17) implies
Similarly, substituting from (A3) and (B19), (B18) implies
The optimal period is the lower bound, x * = 1. 5. Sell N to H and L. This strategy leads to case 5 in stage 2, i.e., no consumer will buy any item in the future. The vendor must set the price such that both H and L prefer to buy N in stage 1 instead of not buying. This
Equilibrium strategies
The above analysis suggests the optimal period to start selling a product, x * = 1. Accordingly, Υ 2 (x) and Υ 3 (x) can be simplified to:
where Υ 1 > Υ 2 > Υ 3 . To derive the equilibrium strategies, we consider the following ranges of v
By (B7) and (B21),
By (B7) and (B23),
By (B16) and (B21), π(1 :
By (B16) and (B23), π(1 :
By (B21) and (B23), π(1 :
Taken together, (B27) to (B32) define the parameters for each of the four candidate strategies to be optimal in equilibrium. For (B27) and (B29) to hold, we must have
which is possible only if n = 3 because δq N > q O . Hence, for all n > 3, strategy {1 : O → L; 2 : N → H; 3 : N → L} is dominated. Similarly, for (B28) and (B29) to hold, we must have
By (B27), (B28), (B29), (B33), and (B34), substituting n = 3, strategy {1 : O → L; 2 : N → H; 3 : N → L} is optimal if and only if
By (B29), (B31), and (B32), strategy {1 : N → H, L} is optimal if and only if v
By (B27), (B30), and (B31), strategy {1 :
and v
By (B28), (B30), and (B32), strategy {1 :
when n = 3.
Additional analysis: If δ = 1, by (B16) and (B21), π(1 :
Only three strategies will remain in the equilibrium. Then, by (B7) and (B16),
which replaces (B27) and is identical to (B33) when δ = 1. Here again, (B37) can be satisfied only if n = 3. Hence, by (B29) and (B37), when δ = 1, substituting n = 3, strategy {1 :
Similarly, by (B29) and (B31), strategy {1 : N → H, L} is optimal if and only if v The following table summarizes the equilibrium outcomes. In general, as d L decreases, i.e., as the number of low type consumers decreases relative to the number of high type consumers, the vendor prefers the strategies in the lower rows in the table.
Parametrization
Vendor's strategy
(ii)
Optimal if and only if
Optimal if and only if n = 3,
, and max{
Optimal if and only if 0
C. Equilibrium outcomes with acquisition and upgrade policy
The game sequence and the analysis of stage 3 are identical to those in the case with acquisition and no upgrade policy. Hence, (A1) and (A2) apply.
Optimal decisions in stage 2 (period y)
There are again five cases. Cases 1, 2, 4 and 5 do not involve selling the same product to consumers with different purchase histories in stage 2. Hence, the outcomes in the scenario with no upgrade policy directly apply. The only difference lies in case 3, whereby the vendor can either sell N to L in stage 2 or sell O to L in stage 2 followed by selling N to L in stage 3. With the upgrade policy, if L do not buy O in stage 2, they will not be able to buy N in stage 3 at the price stated in (A1) because that price will be offered only to consumers holding O. This implies
By (C3) and (B1),
Hence, the vendor prefers to sell N to L in period y. The optimal period is the lower bound, y * = x + 1.
Optimal decisions in stage 1 (period x)
1. Sell O to L. This strategy leads to case 1 in stage 2, i.e., the vendor will sell N only to H in stage 2 and then to L in stage 3. With an upgrade policy, however, the vendor can now prevent L from leapfrogging to N in stage 2. Hence, the price of O in stage 1 is subject to only one constraint,
Together with (A6), the vendor's profit,
2. Sell N to L. This strategy leads to case 2 in stage 2. Similar to case 1, because of the upgrade policy, if L does not buy N in stage 1, it will not be able to buy it in stage 2 at the discounted price. The vendor must set the price such that H prefers to buy N in stage 2 instead of 1,
Substituting from (B1), (C8) implies
Substituting from (A3), (C11) implies
Similarly, the vendor must set the price of O such that
Hence, the price of O is given by (C4). Taken together, the vendor's profit,
The optimal period is the lower bound, x * = 1. 5. Sell N to H and L. This strategy leads to case 5 in stage 2. Following similar analysis as case 5 in Section B,
Equilibrium strategies
By ( 
The following table summarizes the equilibrium outcomes in different parametrization. Note that the equilibrium outcomes with upgrade policy are robust when δ = 1.
Parametrization
Vendor's strategy U (qO,n−1) .
